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The present era has seen an unprecedented fragmentation of the public sphere, a 
breakup of public imperium into separate pieces, not only left in the hands of 
supranational or subnational authorities, but also entrusted to private actors. With 
the abandonment of previously undisputed notions of strict legal verticality and the 
undivided general interest, the separation of powers doctrine as applied in most 
European systems of administrative law is in need of serious rethinking. Current 
debates on the judicial control of governmental discretion are still hampered by a 
discursive language and a legal grammar that tend to draw sharp lines between law 
and policy, awarding each of the three branches of government its own well-defined 
domain. Contrary to widespread belief, the trias politica as an ideology of disjointed 
powers and separate spheres cannot be traced back to Montesquieu's theory of law, but 
only from its philosophical rebuttal and inaccurate reception in subsequent times. 
Ironically, a proper analysis of Montesquieu's theory may indicate a viable way 
forward for a system of review of government actions that attunes to its modern social 
and institutional context.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A familiar image in modern law entails that government officials make some 
of their decisions within a 'sphere of discretion' in which they are free from 
binding legal standards, operating only under democratic control. As it has 
been almost endlessly repeated in many textbooks on administrative law, the 
administrative court should not take over the role of the executive. Instead, 
the court is expected to refrain from infringing the executive's area of free 
decision-making granted to it by the legislature, with the discretionary 
sphere of government officials being only under 'marginal review'.1 Such 
spatial imagery of judicial deference and executive discretion is closely 
related to the classical understanding of the trias politica as a doctrine that 
prescribes a strict separation of powers, leaving matters of policy in the hands 
of the executive while strictly confining judiciary powers to matters of law. 
The disjunction of political will and legal judgment depoliticizes law, 
presenting jurists as the legitimate spokesmen for established principles and 
standards of public consent, 'passive dispensers of a received, impersonal 
justice'.2 Staged as an institution that does not mingle in society's ongoing 
clash of interests, the court merely assesses the executive's abidance to a pre-
ordained set of legal rules, upholding its rhetorical stance of strict neutrality 
and impartiality. As a master strategy of legitimation, the classical separation 
of powers doctrine sustains the legitimacy of the political order, but also of 
the judiciary itself. The authority of the courts comes with their fictional 
isolation from society as an area of political contestation, held to be the 
exclusive domain of the other powers of the triad. Striking a 'historic bargain', 
judicial institutions thus purchase formal independence at the price of 
                                                 
1 For the notion of a 'margin of discretion', see, for example, William Wade and 
Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 
308-310.  
2 Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition. Toward 
Responsive Law (Harper and Row 1978) 57. 
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substantive subordination, having the last say in concrete cases only because 
they follow an external will, and not their own.3 
Time and again, this bargain is struck under the aegis of two of Montesquieu's 
statements about the judge that tend to be mantra-like repeated.4 The first 
of these statements is that judges are nothing but 'mouthpieces of the law' 
(bouches de la loi), 'inanimate beings' (êtres inanimés) incapable of modifying 
either its force or its rigour. The second entails that judges should not be 
annexed to any particular class or other social group, being, 'in some sense, 
inexistent' in society (en quelque façon nulle).5 The Montesquivian judge is thus 
invoked as the emblem of mechanical adjudication, regarded as 'law's 
machine-like intermediary' (l'organe, en quelque façon machinal de la loi), or even 
as a 'juge-automate', law's robotic middleman, impersonally applying abstract 
rules to concrete cases.6 As it is repeatedly and convincingly established in 
serious academic scholarship on Montesquieu's intellectual legacy, the view 
of the Montesquivian judge as a 'juge-automate' is untenable.7 In legal circles, 
the belief in the myth of Montesquieu as mechanical adjudication's founding 
father has nevertheless proven to be amazingly persistent.8 The persistence 
                                                 
3  Nonet and Selznick (n 2) 57-60. 
4 Cf, for example, Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches. A Comparative Model of 
Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press 2013) 18.  
5 Charles de Montesquieu, L'Esprit des lois (first published 1748, Gallimard 1949), bk 
11, ch 6. 
6 François Gény, Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif: essai critique 
(LDGJ 1919) 101. For the image of the Montesquivian judge as a 'juge automate', see 
Charles Eisenmann, 'La pensée constitutionnelle de Montesquieu' in Bicentenaire 
de l'Esprit des lois 1748-1948 (Sirey 1952) 154. The mechanical view is dismissed by 
Eisenmann himself.  
7 Charles Eisenmann, 'L''Esprit des lois' et la séparation des pouvoirs' in Mélanges R. 
Carré de Malberg (Sirey 1933) 165-192; Karel Menzo Schönfeld, 'Rex, Lex et Judex: 
Montesquieu and la bouche de la loi revisited' [2008] European Constitutional Law 
Review 274 and, especially, Till Hanisch, Justice et puissance de juger chez Montesquieu: 
une 'etude' contextualiste (Garnier 2015), with further references. 
8 In the Dutch legal tradition, for instance, the mechanical interpretation of 
Montesquivian adjudication was picked up by influential scholar G.J. Wiarda, thus 
establishing itself as an uncontested truism in academic literature on legal 
interpretation. See GJ Wiarda, Drie typen van rechtsvinding (Tjeenk Willink 1972) 7; 
for a critical discussion of its pervasive influence, see Willem Witteveen, De retoriek 
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of the Montesquivian myth may be explained by the weak discursive links 
between intellectual history and political theory on the one hand, and law on 
the other.9 With each domain typically being trapped within its own issues, a 
'doctrinal story' could establish itself that tells a tale of the great 
Montesquieu as the intellectual champion of a classical model separation, 
replacing ideological and political struggle with the impersonal and timeless 
rationality of the rule of law.10 Today, Montesquieu's legacy would be under 
threat, slowly but surely breaking down under one or more of such divergent 
threats as the rise of executivism, technocratic bureaucratism, the 
privatization of regulatory structures, the internationalization of national 
legal orders, judicial law-making and much more.11 
However, the idea of an unspoilt Montesquivian age of separated powers 
which we now seem to lose contact with is misleading. As I will argue in this 
article, it does not only give an inaccurate representation of Montesquieu's 
original theory, but – perhaps even more important – tends to obstruct the 
development of a modern and balanced trias politica that is responsive to 
current social needs. Contrary to widespread belief, the trias politica as an 
ideology of disjointed powers and separate domains cannot be traced back to 
Montesquieu's own writings, but only to their philosophical rebuttal and 
inaccurate reception in subsequent times. With the rise of the managerial 
state of the neoliberal era, infused with a spirit of governmentality that tends 
to measure everything by standards of output and efficiency, a return to 
Montesquieu's original teachings seems more urgent than ever. Shifting 
'from government to governance', modern public law typically awards far 
                                                 
in het recht. Over retorica en interpretatie, staatsrecht en democratie (Tjeenk Willink 
1988) 295ff. The 'Montesquivian myth' is widespread in other legal cultures as well. 
See, for instance, Peter Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart 
Publishing 2009) 28: 'Montesquieu conceived of the judicial function primarily, if 
not solely, in terms of [...] the application of pre-existing rules to facts. For Antonin 
Scalia's frequent reference to Montesquieu in support of his theory of legislative 
primacy and originalism, see David A Schultz and Christopher E Smith, The 
Jurisprudential Vision of Justice Antonin Scalia (Rowman & Littlefield 1996) 38.    
9 Cf Möllers (n 4) 3. 
10 Willem Witteveen, 'Doctrinal Stories' [1993] International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law 179, 193. 
11 See also Möllers (n 4) 8-10, with further references. 
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reaching discretionary powers in the hands of a plethora of public, semi-
public and private actors similarly put under benchmarks and policy targets.12 
For one thing, this makes the idea of legality as a functional restraint on 
government actions more and more obsolete. Moreover, the fragmentation 
and privatization of public law is at odds with the classical ideal of public 
powers exclusively serving the undivided common good, leaving the public 
sphere in the hands of a network of public and private actors that seem to be 
guided by comparable economic rationalities instead. Thus, textbook lessons 
of judicial deference and 'different domains' of law and policy do not seem to 
live up to the problems that contemporary public law is facing. Ironically, 
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws provides a conceptual understanding of the 
three branches' interrelation that may offer a viable way forward for a system 
of review of government actions that is more responsive to the needs of 
modern times. 
In order to be convincing in indicating some way forward in the turmoil of 
today's most urgent problems and dilemmas, legal scholarship will inevitably 
have to engage with broader historical and philosophical horizons to which 
law is inextricably linked.13 In times of academic specialization, however, 
much of constitutional and administrative law scholarship has come to show 
a preoccupation with the interpretation and schematization of recent 
legislation and case law, setting itself apart from the intellectual context from 
which public law originally developed. Paradoxically, it may be necessary to 
get a firm grip on the past before we can find a viable way forward into the 
future. As Skinner has it, the intellectual historian is like an archaeologist, 
                                                 
12 Samuel Tschorne, 'Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Public Law' in Anna Yeatman 
(ed) Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Public Institutions (Whitlam Institute 2015); 
Yannis Papadopoulos, Democracy in Crisis? Politics, Governance and Policy (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013); Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism (Wiley & 
Sons 2011) 1-28.  
13 Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford University Press 1992). 
See also Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 3, 
referring to the tale of the drunkard's search for his lost keys under a street lamp. A 
passer-by sees him searching and decides to help. After searching the keys for some 
time without success, the passer-by asks the drunkard if he can remember precisely 
where he dropped them. 'Over there, in that dark corner', he responds. 'Then why 
are you searching here?' asks the passer-by. 'Because', the drunkard says, 'there's 
much more light here'.  
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'bringing buried intellectual treasure back to the surface, dusting it down and 
enabling us to determine what to think of it'.14 Law's basic grammar and the 
legal language with which we have become familiar may seem to be self-
evident, but in fact belong to a contingent tradition that we inherited from 
earlier generations. In shaping the present, the past has a clear presentness, 
be it somewhat less visible as the pillars below the surface that the present is 
built on. Only with these pillars having been properly explored and ultimately 
laid bare for analysis can we think of reshaping them into new fundaments for 
a legal and political order that lives up to today's social needs, and is fit to 
meet the challenges of the future. In its relative neglect of its intellectual 
history, however, law may remain trapped within a set of legal structures and 
concepts that it cannot really criticize or transcend.15 
This article's main argument is that current debates on governmental 
discretion and marginal review in administrative law are hampered by the 
unreflected adherence to an inherited legal grammar that we fail to recognize 
as an invented tradition. The evolution of various systems of European 
administrative law is still disturbed by the idea of clear dividing lines that 
keep the three branches of government apart, strictly preventing any of them 
from overstepping its boundaries. The development of judicial review of 
proportionality in Dutch administrative law provides a clear case in point. 
Common Dutch textbook wisdom prescribes that the judiciary should never 
'occupy the seat of the executive', leaving the government the exclusive 
control of a 'discretionary sphere' as it is granted to it by the legislature. Only 
when the government exceeds that sphere's outer margins by taking 
decisions that are clearly irrational can it be held accountable by the court; 
any more intense judicial interference with executive decision-making would 
comprise a brusque violation of Montesquieu's intellectual heritage.16 
However, marginal proportionality testing does not in any way conform to 
Montesquieu's philosophy of law, but rather to the philosophical and legal 
                                                 
14 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press 1998) 112. 
15 Cf H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law (5th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 1-32 on 'tradition' and 'the presence of the past'. 
16 For the Dutch tradition of 'marginal review' of government decisions, see 
especially Boudewijn de Waard, 'Proportionality: Dutch Sobriety' in Sofia 
Ranchordas and Boudewiijn de Waard (eds), The Judge and the Proprtionate Use of 
Discretion (Routledge 2016) 109-124. 
2017}  Montesquieu and Judicial Review 209 
 
thought of those who either actively resisted his legal philosophy, or wrongly 
appropriated it to serve their own ideological agenda. Only a thorough 
analysis of Montesquieu's original theory and its reception in subsequent 
times may provide the groundwork for a model of judicial proportionality 
testing that lives up to the trends of administrative managerialism and 
privatized governance with which we are faced today. 
II. MONTESQUIEU'S BOUCHE DE LA LOI REVISITED 
Historical reconstruction of Montesquieu's appropriation as mechanical 
adjudication's intellectual champion leads us back to François Gény's 
Méthode d'interprétation as a seminal work of European legal scholarship.17 
Citing French revolutionary and tribune Mallia-Garat's contribution to the 
discussion on the new French Civil Code with approval, Gény subscribes to 
the idea that '[t]he law in a republic is an emanation of sovereignty', 
expressing the 'national will' as 'the only power that free human beings can 
acknowledge'. In the brave new world of the French republic, 'the simplicity 
and uniformity of the laws are consequential of absolute equality as the 
constitution's most basic fundament'. Therefore, it should not be permitted 
to any human power 'to change the law or to modify it in its execution or to 
supplement its insufficiency', as such reckless practices would be most 
detrimental to the clear determination of its guarantees, and could ultimately 
even lead to 'anarchy disguised as a judge-made order'. In order to prevent 
such disasters, the court should always follow Montesquieu in being only the 
mouth that pronounces the commands of the law, itself a neutral and 
inanimate being.18 The travaux préparatoires of the French Civil Code testify 
to Portalis' quick rebuttal of Mallia-Garat's selective and decontextualized 
reference to Montesquieu's writings, but his astute confutation of the 
tribune's words was left out of Gény's account of the discussion that would 
turn out to put a powerful spell on generations to come.19 As Eisenmann 
noted, the idea of a strict separation of powers and Montesquieu's Spirit of the 
                                                 
17 Gény (n 6). See also Karel Menzo Schönfeld, Montesquieu en 'la bouche de la loi' (New 
Rhine Publishers 1979) 74. 
18 Mallia-Garat, as cited by Pierre-Antoine Fenet (ed), Recueil complet de des travaux 
préparatoires du Code Civil (vol 6, 1827) 157-158; cf Hanisch (n 7) 150-151. 
19 See also Schönfeld (n 17) 74. 
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Laws soon became 'two terms inextricably linked' (deux termes indissolublement 
liés) for most, if not all scholars of public law.20 
Despite the attempts of some to correct Gény's false rendering of 
Montesquieu's thought, the origin myth of his trias politica as a system that 
prescribes mechanical adjudication, tends to obscure the minds of many 
jurists and scholars up to the present day. Whereas Montesquieu used to be 
hailed by the positivists as their great enlightened predecessor, an early-
modern tyrannicide who has liberated us from a dictatorship of judges,21 
contemporary scholarship is inclined to dismiss his doctrine of separated 
powers as a ghost from the past, a belief in legal determinacy that we have 
now come to know as very naive.22 Both accounts of Montesquieu's doctrine 
are inaccurate, equally disconnected as they are from the relevant primary 
sources. A better-informed report on Montesquieu's theory is provided by 
Schönfeld, who explains that the Montesquivian image of judges as 
'mouthpieces of the law' (bouches de la loi) does not refer to mechanical 
adjudication, but – quite contrarily – to the independence of the court 
towards the other branches of the trias. Widespread medieval wisdom has it 
that law is embodied by the king as 'the law animate' (lex animata), with the 
law being the 'dumbe king' that can only come to life by the voice of the 
supreme ruler as the 'speaking law' (lex loquens). Consequentially, 'the king is 
above the law, as both the author and giver of strength thereto'.23 In other 
words, the king's commands determine the law and not the other way round. 
Montesquieu's description of the court as the 'mouth of the law' (la bouche de 
la loi) implies the opposite. Not the king, but the judge is the 'speaking law' 
(iudex est lex loquens), with 'lex', 'loi' and 'law' not referring to statutory law, but 
to law and justice in general. The depiction of the judge as an 'inanimate 
being' (être inanimé), then, mirrors royal arbitrariness: the court does not 
                                                 
20 Eisenmann (n 7) 165. 
21 Édouard Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux 
États-Unis (Giard 1921) 15-16. 
22 Laurence Claus, 'Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation' 
[2005] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 419. 
23 James I as quoted by Schönfeld (n 17) 42; see also Schönfeld (n 7) 274. 
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invent or make the law, but rather finds it as it derives from prepositive 
principles of natural law.24 
Only quite recently has legal scholarship seen some comprehensive studies 
placing Montesquieu's theory of separated powers within its proper 
historical and philosophical context.25 Montesquieu opens his magnum opus 
by defining the laws 'in their most general signification [...] as the 'necessary 
relations' (rapports nécessaires) arising from the nature of things'.26 Opposing 
contractarians like Bodin and Hobbes, Montesquieu adheres to an 
Aristotelian anthropology of intersubjective relations that conceptually 
precede individual subjectivity.27 Only to a limited extent should law be 
regarded as the artificial creation of autonomous human beings, only 
constrained by a set of self-imposed rules; in addition to 'the laws of their own 
making', they 'have some likewise which they never made'. Before there were 
even human beings, humans were possible, with possible relations and 
possible laws. 'Before laws were made', therefore, 'there were relations of 
possible justice'.28 That is to say, relations determined by law are antecedent 
to their substantiation in material reality, like the radii of a circle are equal 
before it is drawn. To say that there is nothing just or unjust, but what is 
commanded or forbidden by positive laws would turn things upside down, 
ignoring the principles of natural law that underpin Montesquieu's legal 
philosophy. Resisting the voluntarist and imperativist Hobbesian absolutism 
that was dominant at the time, Montesquieu proposes a relational 
understanding of law that finds its conceptual point of origin not – with 
Hobbes – in some contract between previously unbound human beings, but 
                                                 
24 Schönfeld (n 17) 53-55.  
25 See Schönfeld (n 7), Schönfeld (n 17) and, especially, Hanisch (n 7), with further 
references. 
26 Montesquieu (n 5), bk 1, ch 1. 
27 Cf Paul Carrese, Democracy in Moderation. Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Sustainable 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press 2016) 22ff. 
28 Montesquieu (n 5) bk 1 ch 1. 
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in relations governed by law that coincide with – necessarily intersubjective 
– human existence.29 
Montesquieu's relational view of law and justice is also expressed in his idea 
of a trias politica. Political freedom as Montesquieu understands it is 
irreconcilable with monistic concepts of sovereignty that derives all powers 
from the central point of the 'body politic' (corps politique) of the people or the 
'physical body' (corps physique) of the king. Instead, a pluralistic understanding 
of sovereignty would be required in which imperium is shared by multiple 
actors that wield their powers in equal interdependence.30 In fact, little would 
be more despotic than the Jacobin ideal of 'absolute equality' as it would later 
be advocated by Mallia-Garat and Gény, mistakenly hiding behind 'our great 
Montesuieu' (notre grand Montesquieu) as their great intellectual hero.31 In its 
dismissal of any discrimination on the basis of traditional aristocratic values, 
the 'spirit of extreme equality' would necessarily result in a ruthless 
democratic majoritarianism that leaves no room for such outdated notions as 
'manners, order or virtue', having shaken off all standards of deference that 
would be given by nature.32 In a democratic republic 'gone wrong', the people 
understand liberty mistakenly as the absence of opposition, leaving the 
legislature free to pass any law it wants and to impose its will at its 
unrestrained discretion. Equally corrupted is a monarchy in which the prince 
'directs everything entirely to himself', dismissing his essential relatedness to 
others and eventually even confusing the state with his own person.33 Political 
liberty can only exist under a 'moderate government' in which public 
imperium is shared by multiple actors entangled in a precarious balance in 
which no one has the final say, with the constitution establishing some 
                                                 
29 For Montesquieu's theory of law as a relational theory of law, see also Lukas van den 
Berge, Bestuursrecht tussen autonomie en verhouding. Naar een relationeel bestuursrecht 
(Boom juridisch 2016) ch 9, with further references. 
30 See also René Foqué and Joest 't Hart, Instrumentaliteit en rechtsbescherming (Gouda 
Quint 1990) 80-81.  
31 Gény (n 6) 101. For Montesquieu's dismissal of absolute equality, see Montesquieu 
(n 5) bk 8 ch 2. 
32 Montesquieu (n 3) bk 8 ch 3. 
33 Ibid bk 8 ch 6. 
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system of 'power corrected by power' (le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir) that 
prevents that the 'necessary relations' between these actors are disturbed.34 
The relational mindset of essential intersubjectivity also determines 
Montesquieu's famous description of England as a nation that has political 
liberty as 'the direct end of its constitution'.35 The legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of government that Montesquieu discerns are envisioned to 
acknowledge their mutual interdependence, with none of these actors 
regarding 'himself as his own rule' (lui-même sa règle).36 In no case should 
legislative and executive powers be united 'in the same person, or in the same 
body of magistrates'; experience tells us that such persons or bodies tend to 
succumb to the temptation to enact 'tyrannical laws', and 'to execute them in 
a tyrannical manner'. Liberty would not be possible if the courts were to usurp 
the powers of the legislative and the executive. The life and liberty of the 
subject would then be exposed to arbitrary control, threatened by an 
unchecked government of judges setting its own rules and policies. Political 
liberty can only thrive when – like in Montesquieu's idealized England – none 
of the government's branches claim any kind of primacy or prevalence above 
the other. Instead, each of the actors of the trias politica should acknowledge 
its entangledness in a precarious equilibrium that constantly needs 
recalibration in the light of specific circumstances. Each actor should do its 
utmost to prevent that the balance is disturbed. Destabilization – with one 
actor outweighing the other – is disastrous; 'all would [then] be lost'.37 
III. MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHICAL ADVERSARIES 
Montesquieu's relational account of the branches of government being 
entangled in a precarious balance has been criticized from several angles. 
With regard to the judicial assessment of proportionality in administrative 
law, two strands of criticism are particularly relevant. The first of those 
strands is well represented by Rousseau and Kant, who emulate Montesquieu 
in drawing up a political triad, but refuse to accept his pluralistic view on 
                                                 
34 Montesquieu (n 3) bk 11 ch 4. 
35 Ibid bk 11 ch 5. 
36 Ibid bk 6 ch 3. 
37 Ibid bk 11 ch 6. 
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sovereignty, ultimately resulting in a balance of powers that are mutually 
equivalent. Instead, both Rousseau and Kant adhere to a separation of 
powers doctrine in which the ultimate primacy clearly lies with the legislature 
as the only true sovereign. Fearing that a Montesquivian division of powers 
could rip the 'body politic' as he envisions it apart, Rousseau locates the 
source of all legitimate power with 'the general will' of the undivided people. 
The only way to escape the 'might makes right' of nature would be a social 
contract that entails 'the total alienation of each associate, together with all 
his rights, to the whole community', forging an artificial body with a united 
will that releases us from bare natural existence.38 Guided by 'the general 
interest' (le bien commun) as its exclusive point of orientation, the general will 
is not misled by the dispersed variety of 'private interests' that threatens to 
pull the contractants in different directions, breaking the body politic and 
ultimately bringing back the state of nature. Liberating us from the chains of 
nature, the 'general will' should certainly not be confused with the 'will of all'. 
While the latter is no more than 'the sum of particular wills', misguided and 
confused by opposing private interests, the former derives its clear and 
focused infallibility by only taking the common interest of the integrated 
populace into account.39 
Emphasizing the importance of the unfragmented integrity of the 'body 
politic' as the only way out of a natural state determined by the right of the 
strongest, Rousseau heavily criticizes Montesquieu for disregarding the 
importance of such integrity. With sovereignty divided up between three 
branches of government, with none of these branches outweighing the other, 
the Montesquivian state would be nothing more than a 'fantastic being' (être 
fantastique), a deplorable creature that consists of 'disperse components' 
(pièces rapportées) that are only superficially sewn together, not really making 
up an integrated whole. Theorists like Montesquieu would dismember the 
body politic, and then re-assemble the pieces into an incoherent body that 
seems like a man that is composed of 'several bodies, one with eyes, one with 
                                                 
38 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social (first published 1762, Gallimard 1964) bk 1 
ch 6. 
39 Rousseau (n 38) bk 2 ch 3. On the mysterious notion of Rousseau's general will, see 
esp. Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy. A Critical Exposition of Social 
Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel (Harvard University Press 
1982) 98-124. 
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arms, another with feet'.40 Such erroneous thinking would result from a 
serious misunderstanding of what the allocation of tasks to different actors 
should really entail: not a division of sovereignty, but the institution of a clear 
hierarchy that helps the sovereign people to impose, and execute the general 
will as the state's one and only guiding principle. For Rousseau, 'every free 
action' (toute action libre) derives from the combination of 'will' (volonté) and 
'power' (force) as its two constituent causes, with only the former of moral, 
and the latter of mere physical nature.41 The same goes for the 'body politic' 
of the state: it could only do something when the people as the 'legislative 
power' (puissance législative) is assisted by an 'executive power' (puissance 
exécutive) without which the will of the people could not materialize. A 
proper 'rationale of government' (raison du gouvernement) thus entails the 
mere execution of the undivided will of the legislating people as the only true 
sovereign. The same goes for the judicial branch of government (puissance 
judiciaire): like the executive, it is subservient to the legislature, indispensable 
for the 'body politic' to function properly, but ultimately submitted to the 
people's 'general will' as its only point of moral reference.42  
Something similar is expressed by Kant, who regards the idea of separated 
powers as an important safeguard for civic freedom. For Kant, a free republic 
requires 'the political severance of the executive power of the government 
from the legislative power', whereas despotism entails 'the irresponsible 
executive administration of the state by laws laid down and enacted by the 
same power that administers them'.43 In his Doctrine of Right, Kant emulates 
Montesquieu in sketching a political triad consisting of a legislative, 
executive and judiciary power. Different from Montesquieu's account, 
however, these powers are not merely 'co-ordinate with one another', 
keeping each other in check, so as to prevent that any of them would come to 
regard 'himself as his own rule'. Like Rousseau, Kant acknowledges that the 
legislative power, belonging to 'the united will of the people', depends on the 
other powers for its actual realization in the material world. That is not to say 
                                                 
40 Rousseau (n 38) bk 2 ch 2.  
41 Ibid bk 2 ch 3. 
42 Rousseau (n 38) bk 3 ch 1. See also Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 132-139. 
43 Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (first published 1795, Suhrkamp 1977) 205. 
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that Kant's political triad lacks a clear hierarchy. Notwithstanding their 
mutual dependence, the governmental powers are subordinate to one 
another. The executive and the judiciary maintain their authority in their 
own domains, but both are subjected to the will of the legislative power as 
their 'supreme master' (Oberbefehlhaber) or summus rector to which they are 
ultimately submitted. Like the soul needs the body, the legislature needs the 
executive to substantiate its will in the physical world, issuing its decrees and 
promulgating its orders strictly 'in accordance with the law' (zu Folge dem 
Gesetz). Similarly, the judiciary branch of government is expected to derive its 
decisions from the legislature's will as a 'major premise' (Obersatz) ultimately 
determining the outcome by its deductive application to a given case.44 
A second strand of philosophical criticism of Montequieu's trias politica is 
represented by those adhering to the organic idea of the state as an 'ethical 
body', not created by means of some real or imagined contract between its 
individual citizens, but as a natural community – grown as a particular cultural 
and historical entity – that conceptually precedes the individual. Such 
organicist thinking – once widespread, but now largely forgotten – flourished 
especially in nineteenth-century Germany. Hegel, for instance, resists the 
contractarian tradition by maintaining that the state should not be regarded 
as an artificial 'union of men under law', but rather as 'a natural growth', 'an 
ethical whole' (sittliches Ganze), given shape by the culture and history of a 
particular people that would be impregnated with its own 'substantive will' as 
its essential intersubjective point of moral orientation.45 With such monistic 
organicist thinking, Montesquieu's doctrine of shared sovereignty and 
balanced powers is irreconcilable. As a natural growth, a human body meshed 
up in pieces cannot survive. Similarly, the continuity of the organic state 
would be endangered by dividing its sovereignty between a plurality of actors 
without any sense of unbroken ethical commonality. By all means, the 
fragmentation of the state as an integrated 'ethical being' should be 
prevented. Montesquieu's system of checks and balances would only 
stimulate internal 'animosity' (Feindseligkeit), a spirit of 'mutual limitation' 
                                                 
44 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (first published 1797, De Gruyter 1968) paras 
45-48. 
45 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (first 
published 1821, Meiner 2011) para 258.  
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with the reaction of each power to the others being one of 'hostility and fear'. 
In their determination to oppose one another, they would produce a 
fragmented equilibrium rather than a living unity, thus contributing to the 
'destruction of the state' (Zertrümmerung des Staates) as an organic whole 
without which none of its members can survive.46  
IV. MONTESQUIEU'S LEGAL ADVERSARIES 
Both strands of philosophical criticism of Montesquieu's constitutional 
thought have remained of great influence up to the present day. For one 
thing, Montesquieu's model of balanced powers was opposed by legal 
positivists like Paul Laband (1838-1918). Giving the contractarian conception 
of the legal order as an artificial construct a formalist twist, Laband advocated 
an exclusive rule of deductive and syllogistic legal reasoning as the only way in 
which law could ever become a true 'science' (Wissenschaft). As an academic 
discipline, law should be kept pure as an abstract intellectual activity, released 
from any concern about its ethical and social environment as an obstacle of 
scientific progress.47 Laband's legal world is filled with the legal commands of 
the sovereign lawmaker as an absolute master, establishing an impersonal 
'government of laws' (Regierung der Gesetze) that only acknowledges the 
binding force of general provisions as the 'abstract laws of pure thought' (die 
kahlen Gesetze des Denkens).48 On the one hand, Laband's legalistic 
understanding of law entails that the government can only require anything 
from its citizens on the basis of written provisions. As such, Laband's 
'government of laws, not men' holds the promise of a rule of law instead of 
arbitrariness and despotism. On the other hand, however, it also entails the 
impossibility of any prepositive subjective rights of citizens towards the 
state.49 Evidently, Laband's positivism is incompatible with Montesquieu's 
                                                 
46 Hegel (n 45) para 272. On Hegel's stance towards Montesquieu's theory of 
separated powers, see also Fred R Dallmayr, G.W.F. Hegel. Modernity and Politics 
(Rowman & Littlefield 1993) 147ff; for Hegel's lasting influence on public law 
theory, see Loughlin (n 40) 146-153. 
47 Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, vol 1 (2nd edn, Mohr 1887) ix, 
defending the idea of law as 'eine rein logische Denktätigkeit'. 
48 Cf Walter Wilhelm, Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19. Jahrhunderts 
(Klostermann 1958) 79. 
49 Cf Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, vol 2 (Beck 1992) 159. 
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legal universe of 'relations arising from the nature of things', resulting in a 
constitutional architecture of balanced powers and shared sovereignty. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Laband dismisses Montesquieu's 
naturalism as a backward theory that stands in the way of the 'constructive 
work' of modern legal formalism. In its emphasis on a prepositive 
intersubjectivity, Montesquieu's legal theory opposes the pure 'government 
of laws' advocated by Laband. In his discussion of Montesquieu's teachings, 
Laband rests assured that detailed criticism of Montesquieu's intellectual 
legacy is no longer necessary, as modern scholars would be almost unanimous 
in rejecting his theory of balanced powers as an obsolete remnant of an 
unscientific past.50 
Unlike Montesquieu, Laband refrains from any dilution of the lawmaker's 
public imperium as a dangerous threat of the unity of the state. Instead, he 
sticks to the idea that the lawmaker's acts of legislation are performed in a 
legal void, unbound by any prepositive restriction and therefore absolute in 
their legal validity.51 The legislature thus possesses an unimpeded freedom 
that is unchecked by other actors. The practical administration of the state 
is in the hands of the executive, but only as the 'specific application' of general 
rules proclaimed by the lawmaker. As the ultimate source of the law, the 
legislature is the sole bearer of an unshared sovereignty, clearly defining the 
margins in which the executive is bound to operate. As the executive's 
counterweight, the judiciary is expected to review administrative actions on 
the basis of written laws and nothing else. As such, these laws are envisioned 
as the margins of an executive domain that the administration should never 
overstep. At the same time, however, it leaves the executive an uncontrolled 
area of discretion (freies Ermessen) as long as it stays within its own domain.52 
In Dutch legal thought, Laband's positivism is clearly echoed in the legal 
thought of scholar and politician J.A. Loeff (1858-1921) as one of Dutch 
                                                 
50 Paul Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, vol 2 (2nd edn, Mohr 1887) 7. In 
the fourth edition, appearing in 1911, Laband's contemptuous remark on 
Montesquieu's theory is omitted.  
51 Laband (n 50) 172-173: 'Die Akte der Gesetzgebung [...] sind […] auf freier 
Willensbestimmung beruhende, und [...] auch der Rechtsordnung selbst gegenüber freie. 
[...] Der Wille des gesetzgebenden Organs ist dem Recht gegenüber der stärkere; 
das bisher geltende Recht muß ihm gegenüber weichen.' (emphasis added?) 
52 Cf Stolleis (n 49) 341-345. 
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administrative law's most prominent 'founding fathers'. The rule of law as 
Loeff understands it demands that the commands of the sovereign lawmaker 
are obeyed without exception, be it by those 'fallible human beings' who 
make up the administration or by other legal subjects. Therefore, he advances 
a system of judicial review of government actions that is geared towards the 
absolute maintenance of abstract legality, ultimately aiming at a 'pure legal 
order' that is cleared from any unlawful infringements.53 As long as it remains 
within its area of discretion, the administration is free to act as it wishes. Any 
decision beyond these margins, however, should be annulled by the 
judiciary.54 
The legal opposition to Montesquieu's relational theory of scholars like 
Laband and Loeff can thus be seen as the positivistic reflection of the primacy 
of the legislature as it was purported earlier by thinkers adhering to the 
contractarian tradition in political philosophy like Rousseau and Kant. A 
second strand of legal opposition to Montesquieu's relational theory, 
however, builds forth on the organicist thinking of philosophers like Hegel. 
In Hegel's footsteps, for instance, Prussian scholar and politician Friedrich 
Julius Stahl (1802-1861) describes the state as an 'ethical whole' (sittliches 
Ganze), with its individual citizens as its natural constituents. Determined by 
ethical principles rather than formal commands, the Rechtsstaat as Stahl 
understands it comprises much more than only upholding the commands of 
the lawmaker.55 Most essentially, the protection of the Rechtsstaat would 
require the integrity of the state as an 'ethical entity' (sittliches Reich) that is 
not primarily held together by the dictates of rationalistic principles, but 
rather by the 'ethical ideas' that would be ingrained in the common identity 
of a particular community. In Stahl's theory, the integrity of the state as an 
ethical whole requires that the competence of independent courts only 
pertains to private and criminal law. Determined by much more than abstract 
legal reasoning alone, the ethical sphere of administrative law should remain 
                                                 
53 Joannes Aloysius Loeff, Publiekrecht tegenover privaatrecht (Ijdo 1887) 6-7.  
54 Ibid 62. On Loeff's legal thought, see also Lukas van den Berge, ''Der Staat soll 
Rechtsstaat Seyn'. Loeff, Struycken en de Duitse staatsfilosofie' [2014] 
Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 80, with further references. 
55 Cf Katharina Sobota, Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat. Verfassungs‑ und Verwaltungsrechtliche 
Aspekte (Mohr 1997) 320 ff; Stolleis (n 49) 102-105 
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beyond their reach. With the administration curtailed by the abstract legal 
reasoning of the judiciary, the state would be at serious risk of losing its 
ethical integrity, with its orphaned citizens finding themselves as atomized 
legal subjects opposed to the state rather than living their full lives as its 
integral constituents.56 Stahl may thus be described as an early opponent of a 
process of juridification that threatens public life by making everything into 
a 'matter of law' (Justizsache), not only subverting the state as an ethical whole, 
but also disturbing the lives of individual citizens as its organic constituents.57 
Far removed as we tend to be from the organicist thinking of scholars and 
philosophers like Hegel and Stahl,58 we may easily lose sight of the enormous 
influence that their monist ethics have had on the development of European 
public law. For Gerber, for instance, it was self-evident that the state is not some 
artificial entity, but a spirited being that reflects the essential unity of a people 
sharing a common culture and history. As such, the state would have a 'collective 
consciousness' in the undivided ethical 'Spirit' (Geist) of the populace.59 Such 
monist organicism is incompatible with Montesquieu's pluralist theory of a 
                                                 
56 Friedrich Julius Stahl, Rechts‑ und Staatslehre auf der Grundlage christlicher 
Weltanschauung, vol 2 (Mohr 1845) 447: '[D]ie Unterthanen hätten aufgehört, 
ergänzende Glieder des Staates, dieses sittlichen Ganzen zu sein, sondern ständen 
ihm als einem Subjecte ausser ihnen als losgetrennte, unabhängige, gleichartige 
Subjecte gegenüber.'  
57 To contemporary scholars, Stahl is primarily known for his dictum that 'the state 
should be a Rechtsstaat' (Der Staat soll Rechtsstaat seyn). Thus, Habermas holds him 
(with Karl von Rotteck and Robert von Mohl) responsible for the colonization of 
the lifeworld that took place in the process of the 'Verrechtsstaatlichung' of 
society. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. The Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, vol 2 (Polity Press 1987) 357-358. Far more than von Rotteck and 
von Mohl, however, Stahl was well aware that making everything into a 'Justizsache' 
may not only have positive, but also negative consequences. See also Dieter 
Grosser, Grundlagen und Struktur der Staatslehre Friedrich Julius Stahls (Springer 
1963); Sobota (n 55) 320 ff. 
58 Though still reflected in modern conservative thought. See, for example, Roger 
Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Macmillan 1984). 
59 Carl Friedrich Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts (Tauchnitz 1865) 20, 
where Gerber describes the state 'nicht als eine bloss begriffliche Erscheinung, 
sondern als ein auf natürlicher Grundlage, nämlich dem Volke beruhendes Wesen', 
having a 'eigenen Willensinhalt [...] in dem sittlichen, auf das staatliche Leben 
gerichteten Geiste des Volkes'. 
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shared sovereignty that lies distributed among several actors, depending on 
intersubjective relations rather than revolving around some essentialist ethical 
centre. In the development of Dutch administrative law, the organicist thinking 
of Hegel, Stahl, Gerber and others is echoed by A.A.H. Struycken (1873-1923) as 
Loeff's most prominent academic opponent.60 Raising a polemical attack 
against his plans for a system of judicial review of administrative actions, 
Struycken dismisses Loeff's positivistic understanding of law as an emanation of 
a 'legalistic justitialism' that draws up boundaries between the government and 
its subjects as 'heterogeneous elements', thus severely disturbing the integrity of 
the political community.61 As opposed to Loeff's 'pure theory of law', Struycken 
adheres to an anti-positivism grafted upon the mysterious idea of monist 'ethical 
life' (Sittlichkeit) as law's most essential fundament. Following the 'mighty voice 
of Hegel', Struycken rejects the 'all-reasonable [...] spirit of Enlightenment', 
intent as it would be on the destruction of existing cultural and historical 
structures and institutions.62 Suspicious of the 'pure' judicial reason of the 
courts, Struycken rather puts his trust on review within the hierarchy of the 
government itself, better capable as they would be to judge administrative 
actions on the basis of their appropriateness and ethical quality.63 
V. THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF MONTESQUIEU'S ADVERSARIES 
In modern public law, the positivistic approach to administrative law is 
generally regarded as outdated. With the rise of the social state replacing the 
minimal state of nineteenth-century liberalism, the sphere of governmental 
activity has dramatically expanded. It is now generally agreed upon that, to 
some extent, positive state action is required for the proper regulation of 
society and the substantive protection of civil rights.64 The social state came 
with greater powers for government agencies, often awarding them 
                                                 
60 See Van den Berge (n 29) 81 ff; Van den Berge (n 54), with further references. 
61 Antonius Alexis Hendricus Struycken, Administratie of rechter (Gouda Quint 1910) 
15. 
62 Antonius Alexis Hendricus Struycken, Ons koningschap (Gouda Quint 1909) 1-9. 
63 Struycken (n 61) 36-37.  
64 Cf, for example, Sabino Cassese, 'Die Entfaltung des Verwaltungsstaates in 
Europa' in Armin von Bogdandy, Sabino Cassese and Peter Huber (eds), Handbuch 
Ius Publicum Europaeum, vol 3 (Müller 2010) 22-28, discussing the rise of the 
'enabling state' or 'social state' (Sozialstaat) and the concomitant transformation of 
public law in various European jurisdictions. 
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significant degrees of discretion in their concrete exercise. With its wide 
discretionary powers enabling the government to penetrate deeply into 
society, the positivistic notion of the Gesetzesstaat – a rule of codified laws, not 
men – came under increasing pressure. The judiciary responded by 
supplementing its task as the guardian of formal legality with the assessment 
of administrative actions to principles of proper government. One of the 
most appropriate tools to control the interventionist use of discretionary 
governmental powers was found in the principle of proportionality, originally 
developed in German law, but swiftly spreading to European law and other 
jurisdictions in post-war Europe. Embracing the proportionality principle, 
the courts expanded the subsumptive method of adjudication by a balancing 
approach that takes into account whether government action in a certain 
case can be regarded as appropriate, necessary and proportional with regard 
to its aim.65 Evidently, the balancing approach to administrative law comes 
with a redefined understanding of the doctrine of separated powers, with 'no 
walls separating the three branches, but bridges that provide checks and 
balances'.66 
The organicist approach to administrative law seems even more 
disconnected from modern law. The organicist objections against judicial 
review of government actions were closely related to the idea of the monarch 
as the embodiment of the state's ethical unity and the related view of the 
executive as the guardian of the state's ethical integrity. It was once quite 
common to be very suspicious towards the reasoning of the independent 
judiciary as 'a class which makes itself exclusive even by the terminology it 
uses, inasmuch as this terminology is a foreign language for those whose rights 
are at stake'.67 In the organicist view, the ratiocinations of independent 
judicial reason are particularly dangerous in administrative law as a legal 
domain that should be guided by a heartfelt common ethics, rather than by 
abstract legal principles. In his polemical attack on Loeff's plans for a system 
of independent judicial review of government actions, for example, 
                                                 
65 See Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law. A 
Comparative Study (Kluwer 1999) 5-22. 
66 Aharon Barak, Proportionality. Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 385. 
67 Hegel (n 45) para 228. 
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Struycken shows himself distrustful of the independent judiciary as an 
unworldly class of academicians that would be out of touch with the ethics of 
society. For the adjudication of administrative disputes, Struycken rather 
puts his trust in the administration itself as 'the embodiment and 
personification' of 'the common ideals' of the people. Unlike the 
independent court, the administration itself would not only dispose of the 
required technical and practical knowledge in administrative matters.68 
Proper ethical guidance would also ensure that government officials have 'the 
character' that enables them to reach decisions in administrative matters that 
do not only conform to abstract rules, but also to a common popular ethics as 
administrative law's most essential principle.69 Needless to say, perhaps, such 
monistic ethical reasoning is incompatible with the pluralist legal ethics that 
have shaped the dominant jurisprudence of today. 
The general dismissal of both the positivistic and the organicist stances to 
administrative law does not mean, however, that their influence on legal 
debates as they are waged today, has been reduced to zero. Their presence 
can be still felt in the discursive language in which problems of administrative 
law continue to be framed. Dutch academic debates on proportionality 
testing in administrative law provide a clear case in point, with other legal 
cultures in Europe and elsewhere dealing with similar problems.70 The 
discussion on the intensity of judicial review of administrative decisions in 
Dutch law is still dominated by the spatial imagery of each branch of 
government controlling its own domain, with each branch inhabiting a 'seat' 
                                                 
68 Struycken (n 61) 30-31. 
69 See Hegel (n 45) paras 294-295 for an exposition on the proper 'Bildung der Beamten', 
moulding their character in order to make sure that they would reach the right 
decisions. The importance of character for administrative judgment is similarly 
emphasized by Struycken. See Struycken (n 59) 36-37.  
70 See Sofia Ranchordas and Boudewiijn de Waard (eds), The Judge and the 
Proportionate Use of Discretion (Routledge 2016) for a handsome overview of 
proportionality testing in German, French, English, US and EU administrative law, 
with many further references. The Dutch tradition of judicial deference and 
'marginal review' of government decisions more or less resembles the Wednesbury 
irrationality test as it was developed in English law. See Paul Craig, 
'Proportionality, Rationality and Review' [2010] New Zealand Law Review 265 and 
Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law (Cambridge University Press 
2012) ch 5 for divergent opinions on the merits of the Wednesbury test.  
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that should be left unoccupied by others.71 The government has the exclusive 
control of the 'discretionary sphere' as it is granted to it by the legislature. 
Within its own domain, the administration is free to balance the interests at 
hand and reach a decision as it seems most desirable. Only when it oversteps 
its domain by taking a decision that it 'could not reasonably have reached', 
the judiciary has the task of correcting that decision.72 As such, the Dutch 
administrative court operates according to a logic of marginality that clearly 
echoes the positivistic notion of a governmental area of 'free discretion' (freies 
Ermessen). Within its discretionary sphere, the government is free to act as it 
pleases; legal obligations only exist beyond that sphere's margins. Moreover, 
the Dutch doctrine of 'marginal review' of government actions seems to be 
an enduring reflection of the organicist fears of invasive judicial reasoning by 
unworldly judges. The margins of the government's discretionary domain 
clearly fence off matters of policy, from matters of law, and thus make sure 
that the court only interferes with the latter.73 
The roots of the Dutch doctrine of marginal review in positivistic and 
organicist thought clearly emerge from a seminal article by the influential 
legal scholar H.D. van Wijk as the doctrine's primary intellectual source. In 
Van Wijk's classical paper, it is argued that the 'ongoing withdrawal' of the 
almighty legislator that is typical of the rise of the social state does not 
demand an 'advancing court', but rather a more deferential court 'as the 
mirror image [that] must depart from the person who moves away from the 
mirror'.74 Unlike its civil counterpart, the administrative court would not be 
a referee, adjudicating the concrete dispute that is presented to him, but only 
a linesman; all he can do is to judge beyond the 'margin of the free consent of 
the executive'.75 Van Wijk's reasoning thus follows the logic of strictly 
separated powers and legislative primacy. Moreover, his ideas are 
                                                 
71 For a critical discussion of the pervasive imagery of the three branches of 
government each occupying their own 'seat', see also Witteveen (n 8) 282 et seq.  
72 Extensive explanation and ample references on governmental discretion in Dutch 
administrative law is provided by Raymond Schlössels and Sjoerd Zijlstra, 
Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat, vol 1 (Kluwer 2016) 118-133.  
73 See also Van den Berge (n 29) 271. 
74 Hendrik Daniël van Wijk, 'Voortgaande terugtred' in Besturen met recht (VNG 
1974) 99-100. 
75 Ibid 105-111. 
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reminiscent of the organicist view of the court as an eccentric institute of 
unworldly judges who would not dispose of the proper character and heartfelt 
acquaintance with administrative matters to reach adequate decisions in 
those matters. Acknowledging that the 'withdrawal of the legislature' has left 
citizens unprotected to the discretionary powers of government, Van Wijk 
argues that proper armour against such powers should not be sought in an 
administrative court that is moulded to its civil counterpart, but rather in 
specialized tribunals within the hierarchy of government itself. Detached 
from the problems and dilemmas of government, an independent 
administrative court would tend to follow abstract lines of reasoning that 
alienate it from society. Whereas the judge is distrusted as an ethical outsider, 
the administration is recognized as a force within society that would thus 
dispose of the ethical knowledge that enables it to take the right decisions.76 
Van Wijk's model of 'marginal review' of government actions has remained 
the leading doctrine up to the present day. In the landmark case of Maxis and 
Praxis, the Dutch Council of State (acting as administrative court in highest 
instance) held that 'courts are not meant to assess [...] which weighing of 
interests is to be considered as the most balanced'.77 Instead, the courts 
should stick to a 'restrained control' of the use of discretionary powers by the 
government. Article 3:4, section 2 of the General Administrative Law Act 
(GALA) reads that the adverse consequences of governmental decisions 
should not be disproportionate to their purposes. As the Council argued, the 
double negative in that provision implies that judicial interference with 
administrative decisions is only warranted in cases of manifest 
disproportionality or arbitrariness. Thus, the Council rejected to follow the 
German and European example of more pervasive proportionality testing, 
explicitly confirming the paradigm of 'marginal control' instead.78 Only the 
testing of punitive sanctions is excepted from the marginal approach.79 In the 
case of a 'criminal charge' as described in Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to 
                                                 
76 Cf Van den Berge (n 29) 287-290. 
77 Maxis & Praxis ABRvS 9 May 1996, JB 1996/158. The case is sometimes referred to 
as Kwantumhal Venlo.  
78 See also de Waard 'Proportionality: Dutch Sobriety' (n 16) 115-117, with further 
references. 
79 Schlössels and Zijlstra (n 72) 376-377. 
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a fair trial is taken to require a full judicial review of proportionality.80 Thus, 
the courts gave shape to a rather binary practice in which the proportionality 
of government decisions is either fully or only marginally tested. Only 
recently, they seem to shift towards a more nuanced approach in which the 
intensity of judicial review is tailored to the particular case at hand. In a 
recent case on earthquakes caused by the production of natural gas in the 
province of Groningen, for instance, the Council of State reduced gas 
production, arguing that the government's decision for ongoing large-scale 
production was badly motivated, and therefore untenable towards those who 
saw their fundamental rights endangered because of it.81 As commentators 
were quick to argue, the Council's decision in the Groningen case can only be 
understood by recognizing it as much more than only a correction of the 
government's failure to motivate its decision properly; what the court really 
aims to do, in fact, is to correct its disproportionality. Interestingly, however, 
the still prevailing doctrine of marginal review withholds it of doing so in a 
more explicit way.82 
VI. THE NEED FOR A MONTESQUIVIAN REVIVAL 
At the backdrop of the rise of the social state, the idea of marginal 
proportionality testing as it was proposed by Van Wijk was arguably already 
obsolete when it was first invented. Based on a monist ideology of legislative 
primacy and ethical essentialism, it failed to deliver a system in which the 
strong intertwinement of executive and legislative powers was properly 
counterbalanced by a strong and independent judiciary.83 Now that we have 
reached a neoliberal era in which public space has been infused with an 
unprecedented managerialism, the need for a strong and independent 
administrative court as a forceful counterpower has become even more 
urgent.84 Exposed to the rigour of a globalized economy, modern states have 
                                                 
80 de Waard (n 16) 117-118. 
81 Groninger gaswinning, ABRvS 18 November 2015, JB 2015/218. 
82 See also Martha M Roggenkamp, 'The Position of Citizens in Energy Production 
in the Netherlands: Is a New Approach Emerging?' in Lila Barrera-Hernández and 
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had little choice but to follow depoliticized economic policies of 
privatization, reduced public spending and marketization of the government 
itself, now more than ever focusing on quantitative standards of outcome and 
efficiency.85 Some even argue that we have entered post-democratic times in 
which the democratic institutions have survived, but only to serve as little 
more than the humble servants of private or non-governmental actors as the 
real powers determining their policies behind the scenes.86 While some mark 
the 2008 financial crisis as 'the end of neoliberalism', scholars like Colin 
Crouch have convincingly argued that, for the foreseeable future at least, the 
neoliberal order is there to stay, with democratic institutions still quite 
defenceless against non-governmental transnational organizations and large 
corporations.87 Burdened with traditions of organicism and legislative 
primacy, leaving far reaching public powers in the hands of a diffused plethora 
of public and private agents largely unchecked, the judiciary cannot 
contribute much to defend us against such actors. Therefore, it seems time 
for a Montesquivian revival that takes the idea of balanced powers – of a 
system of force and counterforce (le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir) – seriously at last. 
Shifting 'from government to governance', modern public law has typically 
embraced a network theory of interdependent public and private actors that 
take common responsibility for public policy.88 The present era of 
privatization, decentralization and individualization has seen an 
unprecedented fragmentation of the public sphere, a breakup of public 
imperium into separate pieces, with its broken fragments often invested with 
great discretionary powers. For one thing, the ongoing increase of 
discretionary powers in the neoliberal era seems to make the idea of formal 
legality as a functional restraint on the wielding of public powers more and 
more obsolete. Moreover, the governance model of interdependent 
regulation is at odds with the classical idea of idea of state actors being strictly 
guided by rules and principles that serve the undivided general interest. 
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Instead, the neoliberal model tends to put public and private actors under 
similar benchmarks of outcome and efficiency, encouraging them to follow 
comparable patterns of goal-oriented economic behaviour.89 Thus, a theory 
of 'marginal review' in public law that sticks to the classical notion of strictly 
separated powers and remains overly attached to the organicist idea of 
independent judges as dangerous outsiders seems unable to deliver the 
counterweight against governmental powers that is needed in its 
contemporary social and institutional context. Ironically, a return to 
Montesquieu's original theory of natural relations, shared sovereignty and 
balanced powers may provide a possible way forward.90 
For one thing, the Montesquivian spirit of essential intersubjectivity is 
incompatible with the idea of the sovereign lawmaker as it is envisioned both 
in voluntarist and organicist theories of law. Like other legal subjects, public 
actors are legally bound by 'necessary relations' – that is to say, by prepositive 
obligations from which they cannot withdraw – the legislator no less than the 
administration. The idea of an essential and legally binding intersubjectivity 
is irreconcilable with the classical notion of an area of free discretion as a kind 
of empty space or vacuum in which the government is exempt from law. 
Instead, the Montesquivian spirit of forces and counterforces requires full 
and principled assessment to criteria of appropriateness, necessity and 
proportionality, binding public and private actors in like manner. That is not 
to say, of course, that nothing prevents the Montesquivian judge from 
interfering with matters of policy and law-making – on the contrary, any 
system in which a branch of government regards 'himself as his own rule' (lui-
même sa règle) is dismissed by Montesquieu as a path towards dictatorship, as 
'all would [then] be lost'.91 In Montesquieu's 'moderate constitution' of 
balances and necessary relations, the actors of the classical triad each have 
their own task – be it law-making, administrating or judging. None of these 
tasks, however, is performed in splendid isolation, strictly removed from the 
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reach of the other branches of government. Instead, legislature, executive, 
and judiciary are inextricably entangled in a precarious balance – an ongoing 
debate in which no one has the final say.92 
Moreover, the Montesquivian approach to law also dismisses the organicist 
tradition of conceptualizing the state as some unified natural body, a 
mysterious ethical entity with its citizens as its integral constituent. Unlike 
the ethical monism of Hegel, Stahl, and others, Montesquieu's theory fits 
well with the pluralist account of law that has become generally accepted 
today. The idea of some 'Archimedean point' from which to determine a 
common ethics (Sittlichkeit) seems incompatible with modern trends of anti-
essentialism and differentialism as they have become en vogue in the 
contemporary western world.93 As Lefort writes, 'democratic society 
established itself as a society without a body, as a society that resists its 
traditional representation as an organic totality'.94 In a modern democratic 
society, the collective identity of the community escapes unequivocal 
determination, with none of its participants being able to impose its monistic 
will on others. The place of power should remain an 'empty space' (lieu vide), 
free from any permanent occupation, be it either by the mysterious notion of 
Rousseau's 'general will', or Hegel's common Sittlichkeit.95 By no means does 
the 'empty space of power' entail that the idea of a common ethics or a 
collective sense of purpose should be abandoned, leaving legal subjects in an 
atomic state of fragmentation as feared most, in particular by organicist 
thinkers like Stahl. On the contrary, power's empty space necessitates an 
ongoing deliberation about its proper use, so that the emptiness that Lefort 
describes facilitates connections rather than destroying them. The open 
space as envisioned by Lefort is only compatible with a Montesquivian trias 
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politica as a balance with none of its actors reigning supreme – bound as they 
are in a shared sovereignty that requires ongoing discussion. 
Surely, the actors of the triad each bring their own special expertise to that 
debate. However remote they often function from the democratic process, 
administrative agencies usually have greater democratic legitimacy than 
courts. Moreover, they tend to possess greater expert knowledge and 
technical competence while laying out their policies.96 Both advantages of 
the executive provide solid ground for judicial deference, preventing the 
court to install a 'government of judges' in which the judiciary only recognizes 
its own authority.97 As Montesquieu reminds us, a political order in which 
'the judge himself is his own rule' (le juge est lui-même sa règle), aiming to occupy 
the sovereign throne all by himself, will inevitably fall prey to arbitrariness 
and despotism.98 Nevertheless, Montesquieu's theory of law is equally 
concerned about a legal order in which matters related to policy and law-
making are removed from the judiciary's area of competence altogether, 
fended off from the court's influence by means of some imagined borderline 
that keeps law apart from politics. As Martin Loughlin has shown with such 
great force and learnedness in his work on the foundations of public law, the 
practice of drawing watertight divisions between the legal and the political 
has turned out to be inappropriate, obfuscating public law's inherently 
political nature. Therefore, it is time to re-examine and rejuvenate European 
public law's intellectual roots in the philosophical tradition of 'political law' 
(droit politique), with Montesquieu as one of its primary representatives.99 
How could a Montesquivian approach to proportionality testing in 
administrative law take shape in practice? Perhaps the metaphor of 'total 
football' is a good candidate to replace the sunken imagery of the three 
traditional branches of government, each tied to their fixed positions. The 
tactical theory of total football was invented by the 'mighty Magyars' in the 
1950s, further developed by Michels and Cruyff in the 1970s, and now 
elaborated upon by successful football managers like Guardiola and others. 
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In accordance with other strategies, the players enter the field in a 
predetermined line-up, each awarded with a specific task as a defender, 
midfielder or attacker, posted either on the left or right side, or at the centre 
of the pitch. Once the game has begun, however, there is nothing that forces 
them to stick to their position at all costs. On the contrary, they are 
encouraged to take up position on the field as the game demands it, moving 
into unoccupied spaces and filling the gaps that other players leave behind.100 
In the current context of privatization and fragmentation of the public 
sphere, with vast discretionary powers frequently awarded to agents living up 
to their benchmarks at great distance from the democratic process, there 
may often still be good reasons for the court to acknowledge the other 
branches' primary responsibilities in law and policy-making. More frequently 
than before, however, situations may occur that demand the judiciary to 
overstep the imaginary boundaries of the domain to which it has so anxiously 
restricted itself in many modern European systems of public law. The 
neoliberal administrative state in which we now live, requires a court that no 
longer hides behind a fixed constitutional architecture, but takes on the 
responsibilities with which modern administrative reality confronts it. The 
Montesquivian theory of balanced powers and shared sovereignty provides it 
with the theoretical tools enabling it to live up to those responsibilities. That 
is not to say, of course, that the branches of power should forget about their 
primary tasks altogether. In fact, one of the weaknesses of 'total football' is 
the disorganization that may come out of unwarranted position switching. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With the outlines of Montesquieu's original theory, its reception and his 
adversaries' and mistaken interpreters' enduring influence in the present era 
having been explored, it is time to draw some conclusions. Contrary to 
common belief, the idea of marginal review of the government's use of 
discretionary powers is unconnected to Montesquieu's relational account of 
law. Instead, it relies on the ideas of those who contributed to its refutation 
and distorted representation, burdening today's debate on executive 
discretion and judicial deference with a tenacious myth of the Montesquivian 
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judge as the emblem of mechanical adjudication. On the one hand, the 
practice of marginal review is driven by the notion of legislative primacy as it 
can be traced back to philosophers like Rousseau and Kant, whose 
voluntarist theories of unshared sovereignty were given a positivistic twist by 
lawyers and jurists like Laband and Loeff. In the empty legal universe of the 
positivists, the legislature – being the exclusive source of law – is the bearer 
of an undivided public imperium that remains unchecked by other actors, 
leaving the executive an uncontrolled area of discretion as long as it does not 
overstep its domain as it is fenced off by the legislature. On the other hand, 
the concept of marginal review and administrative discretion has organicist 
roots in the double image of the executive as integral part of the state's 
natural body, and of judges as unworldly outsiders, unfamiliar as they would 
tend to be with the common ethics that keeps the public community 
together. 
Even with the positivistic and organicist stances to law becoming more and 
more obsolete, their influence can still be felt in the imagery, and the 
discursive language in which contemporary legal problems continue to be 
framed. The discussion on the intensity of proportionality testing in Dutch 
law – resembling similar discussions in other legal cultures – is a clear example 
here. That debate is still dominated by the spatial imagery of each branch of 
government controlling its own domain, with the legislature, the executive, 
and the judiciary inhabiting their own particular 'seats' that should be left 
unoccupied by others. As a distant echo from an obsolete past, leading Dutch 
doctrinal thought still envisions the governmental domain of discretion as a 
legal vacuum, sharply distinguished as an area of policy, and not of law. Within 
its discretionary sphere, the government is free to act as it pleases; legal 
obligations and judicial competence only exist beyond that sphere's margins. 
Originally invented to serve the minimal state of classical liberalism, that 
model of judicial deference was already at odds with the increase of 
administrative discretion and the expansion of governmental activity that is 
typical of the rising social state. We have now arrived in a neoliberal era in 
which public imperium is broken into pieces, left in the hands of a plethora of 
public, semi-public and private actors similarly put under benchmarks and 
policy targets. Against the backdrop of that neoliberal reality, the concept of 
marginal review has arguably become so strange to its social and institutional 
context that it has become untenable. 
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For one thing, the neoliberal state invests its agents with discretionary 
powers that even tend to exceed those of the social state. The ongoing 
increase of open powers in the hands of governmental bodies makes the idea 
of formal legality as a functional restraint even more obsolete than it already 
was in the days of the social state. Moreover, the trends of privatization, 
decentralization and the marketization of the government itself seem hardly 
compatible with the classical ideal of directing public power strictly to the 
enhancement of the undivided common good; instead, both public and 
private actors seem rather inclined to follow their own institutional interests, 
guided by similar economic rationalities of output and efficiency. Thus, 
proper protection of rights needs far more than a deferential court that only 
intermingles with the executive's task beyond the margins of some legal void 
as an area that is only political control. The present neoliberal era requires a 
return to Montesquieu's philosophical spirit of essential relations and mutual 
balance, with the court providing proper counterweight against the wielding 
of public power by principled and full constraint by norms of 
appropriateness, subsidiarity and proportionality. Only a constitution that is 
permeated with the idea of force and counterforce (le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir), 
envisioning the trias politica as a precarious balance in which none of the 
actors claims the final say, will ultimately deliver the checks and balances that 
we need in modern society. In that sense, Montesquieu's original doctrine of 
shared sovereignty and necessary relations provides for an urgent current 
need.
